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ABSTRACT
Dynamic tainting is an important part of modern software engineer-
ing research. State-of-the-art tools for debugging, bug detection
and program analysis make use of this technique. Nonetheless, the
research area based on dynamic tainting still has open questions,
among others the automatic generation of program inputs.
My proposed work concentrates on the use of dynamic tainting
for test case generation. The goal is the generation of complex
and valid test inputs from scratch. Therefore, I use byte level taint
information enhanced with additional static and dynamic program
analysis. This information is used in an evolutionary algorithm to
create new offsprings andmutations. Concretely, instead of crossing
and mutating the whole input randomly, taint information can
be used to define which parts of the input have to be mutated.
Furthermore, the taint information may also be used to define
evolutionary operators.
Eventually, the evolutionary algorithm is able to generate valid
inputs for a program. Such inputs can be used together with the
taint information for further program analysis, e.g. the generation
of input grammars.
CCS CONCEPTS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Dynamic tainting is a dynamic program analysis method which
is used to track data in an executing program. Unique identifiers,
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Figure 1: Dynamic Tainting and Input GenerationWorkflow
called taints, are attached to values based on predefined rules or
manually. The propagation of those taints through the program can
then be used to compute data flows.
Tainting itself has numerous applications, among others: debug-
ging [4], finding and analyzing security threats [11], and generating
grammars [8]. Especially for the dynamic analysis of programs, in-
puts are needed.
Böhme et al. [2] have shown that random input generation is
in theory in most cases more efficient than sophisticated input
generation methods. Since many programs have highly structured
inputs, up to the point where they are governed by grammars,
random test generators likely produce inputs that are rejected in the
parsing phase. Therefore, random input generation is not sufficient
to test the actual program functionality. Thus, programmers still
need to create inputs manually or define a language model that can
be used by a fuzzer [6, 7]. Both are time and cost consuming.
Together with symbolic execution, tainting has become an impor-
tant part in the software engineering research [12]. In contrast to
dynamic tainting, symbolic execution techniques create constraints
for the input over execution paths without actually executing a
program. Such constraints can then be solved to create an input
that executes the path. State-of-the-art tools like Klee [3] try to
generate test inputs for arbitrary programs by using symbolic exe-
cution, which, as Godefroid et al. describe, is often not sufficient
for highly structured inputs (e.g. compiler and interpreter) [6].
I propose to use tainting information to automatically generate
complex and valid inputs for programs with highly structured in-
puts (Figure 1). To instantiate the approach, I create a tool called
LTaint, which uses LLVM bitcode to analyze an application and is
therefore capable of analyzing languages (likeC) that are compilable
to the LLVM intermediate representation which can be compiled
to machine code. LLVM is an infrastructure which enables, among
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others, code analysis, optimization and instrumentation on an in-
termediate representation. The taint information can be used to
guide an evolutionary algorithm for automatic test input generation.
For example, the taint information for a branch instruction shows
which parts of the program input influence the instruction and
therefore needs to be mutated to alter which branch is being taken.
Furthermore, taint and execution information of my approach can
be used to calculate the fitness function, e.g. by taking code and
input coverage1 into account.
Dynamic tainting can be used together with the generated in-
puts to perform further program analysis, e.g. the generation of
context free grammars. Höschele et al. are currently building a
grammar generation tool, AutoGram [8], which automatically in-
fers a context free grammar based on the program structure with
the help of dynamic tainting. Their approach uses a program and a
set of valid sample inputs. The executing program gets analyzed
by a dynamic tainter for Java, called JFlow, which creates a list of
taint information events. This list contains a) Method entries and
exits, b) Array accesses and c) Field accesses with the taints of their
operands. AutoGram analyzes those events to infer a context free
grammar. Such a grammar can then be used by a grammar-based
fuzzer to fast generate valid and complex inputs.
A large amount of software is written in LLVM bitcode compil-
able code. Nonetheless, compared to Java, the bitcode delivers less
information, important details, like the size of an array may not
always be present. This information is needed to report taints of all
elements in an array if it is referenced by a pointer. Additional com-
putations need to be done to cope with the drawbacks induced by
the lower level of LLVM. I propose to use dynamic tainting together
with static and dynamic program analysis to create high level taint
information, e.g. the taints of all elements of an array. Furthermore,
implicit data flows are a problem while analyzing programs with
highly structured inputs. For example, a string to token conversion
often happens implicitly by comparing a string and assigning a
variable with a token based on the outcome of the comparison. This
leads to under-tainting (the token would not get the taints of the
string) and needs to be detected. I plan to automatically detect such
parts of the program, e.g. with pattern matching. This additionally
increases the precision of the tainting approach.
Eventually, the high level taints and implicit data flows can be
used together with automatically generated inputs to enhance or
even enable further program analysis, like grammar learning or to
enforce confidentiality and integrity. In the work of Tsankov et al.
[13], high level taints would be needed to report the taints of a char
array at a sink to extract if information from a non-confidential
source is leaked or to enforce integrity by reporting and anonymiz-
ing data that has to be sanitized.
My hypothesis is that dynamic tainting can be used to answer
the following research questions positively:
RQ1 Is it possible to extract enough information from a pro-
gram in LLVM bitcode format to generate high level taint
information events?
RQ2 Is it possible to detect relevant implicit data flows that
would result in under-tainting?
1The amount and usage of input that was actually read by the program in comparison
to the input that was given.
RQ3 Can dynamic tainting be used together with an evolution-
ary algorithm to automatically generate valid and complex
inputs for programs with highly structured inputs?
2 BACKGROUND
Many tainting approaches exist that focus on specific tasks [12].
Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge there exists no tainting
approach on the abstraction level of LLVM , which is able to report
high level taints. I propose to take program analysis into account
in order to report, among others, taints of full arrays, structure
names associated with taints or implicit data flows which would
cause under-tainting. Problems like implicit data flows are already
investigated by some approaches [9], but not in the context of
automatic input generation and not together with high level taints.
To the best of my knowledge, dynamic tainting is not used for
automatic input generation. Nonetheless, other approaches try to
generate inputs from scratch, like symbolic execution approaches.
They collect constraints over program paths with respect to the
input variables of the program. Those constraints are solved in
order to get input values that trigger those paths. One state-of-the-
art tool which uses symbolic execution is Klee [3]. Klee shows,
that symbolic execution can perform well on programs with small
input structure. Nonetheless, complex programs, which use highly
structured input, usually have complex path constraints. Such con-
straints are often hard to solve, in general constraint solving is
NP-complete. Therefore, input generation with symbolic execution
does not perform well on complex programs with many paths and
a highly structured input [6].
Evolutionary algorithms are also used for input generation. They
iteratively refine the set of inputs by using metrics obtained from
program analysis (like branch distance). For example, American
Fuzzy Lop [1], an “instrumentation guided genetic fuzzer” [1] ana-
lyzes the program under test while it is executing and adapts the
already used inputs by mutating them. If such a mutant discovers a
new program path, it is added to the set of inputs from which new
mutations can be generated.
First tests with afl on cJson [5] have shown, that afl needs
more information than just one json object as test input to gen-
erate meaningful and more sophisticated inputs. This problem is
already known2. Concretely, the generated inputs from afl still
only contained one json object with only small alternations, even
after days of running. I believe that dynamic tainting can be used
to enhance the selection of new inputs and the mutation of existing
ones such that an evolutionary approach is able to successfully
generate inputs for programs with highly structured input.
3 PROPOSED APPROACH
Figure 1 shows an overview of my proposed framework. It consists
of four main parts that are discussed in more detail in this section:
a) Instrumentation, b) Execution, c) Analysis and d) Input gener-
ation. After instrumenting the program, it can be executed with
inputs from the evolutionary input generation (which are initially
random). The execution is analyzed with dynamic tainting and
2http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/afl/README.txt,
http://lcamtuf.blogspot.de/2015/04/finding-bugs-in-sqlite-easy-way.html
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the taint information is used in the evolutionary input generation
phase to generate new inputs that might trigger new paths.
3.1 Instrumentation
Each LLVM instruction gets instrumented such that dynamic infor-
mation for the analysis can be written out in the execution phase as
a trace. The information for each instruction consists of: a) Name
of the surrounding method b) Opcode c) Names of all operands
d) Types of all operands e) Values of all operands (excluding the
assigned variable) and is needed to perform the taint propagation.
Furthermore, information about global variables, functions and
structures are collected statically in the instrumentation phase. The
information contains names, types and for structures also the size
in bytes. Additionally, information for the detection of implicit data
flows can be collected. This information is later used in the analysis
phase to achieve a more precise taint propagation.
3.2 Execution
In the execution phase sample inputs are used to run the program
under test and to generate the trace. Those inputs can be provided
by the evolutionary input generation. In this case, the initial inputs
are random and are iteratively refined by the evolutionary input
generation with the help of the computed taint information (Figure
1). The generated trace gets consumed by the analysis to perform
the taint propagation.
3.3 Analysis
The analysis takes as input the generated execution trace and per-
forms the actual taint propagation based on the propagation se-
mantics I define for LLVM bitcode, which follow the actual LLVM
instruction semantics. For example, for an addition, the sum of both
operands is assigned to a variable, thus, the taints of both operands
are assigned to the variable. Furthermore, my approach performs
additional computations to generate high level taint information,
e.g.: a) full bounds check for arrays to report taints for pointer and
b) mapping of addresses to structure elements. The output of the
analysis are the taints of the operands for each executed instruction.
To achieve a), the proposed approach has to collect information
about memory allocations. For each pointer the size of the allocated
memory has to be stored as well as the address it points to. If the
memory is later accessed, the size of the allocated memory is known
and the taints of the elements contained in the array are reported.
For b) a similar approach is used. If a structure is created, the
information where the structure is stored to gets connected with
the static information about the structure. At a structure access this
information can be used, together with the dynamic information
regarding the index of the element that is accessed, to report the
name of the used structure element for instance.
Additionally, I propose to implement a control flow analysis to
detect implicit data flowswhich would lead to under-tainting. Figure
2 gives an example. The first program argument is compared to a
static string and a token is assigned to a variable if the strings are
equal. Therefore, the assigned variable containing the token should
have the taints of the input string. Otherwise, the information that
the token assignment is based on the value of the first argument is
lost.
/ / i npu t : token1
enum t okens { TOKEN1 , TOKEN2 , TOKEN3 }
in t main ( in t argc , char ∗ argv [ ] ) {
char ∗ a = argv [ 1 ] ;
enum t okens t ;
i f ( s t rcmp ( a , " token1 " ) ) {
t = TOKEN1 ;
/ / t shou ld have t a i n t s o f the i npu t now
}
return 0 ;
}
Figure 2: The variable containing the token should still have
the taints of the originating string after conversion.
The code in Figure 2 could be part of a lexer, where strings
are often converted to tokens that are then used in the parsing
part of the application. To analyze the parsing precisely, the taints
must “survive” the implicit data flow. In my thesis I investigate how
such flows can be detected with focus on programs with highly
structured inputs. A good starting point is to apply patternmatching
on such parts of the code. In this case the pattern is simple: the
name of the token fits with the name of the string it is derived from.
3.4 Automatic Input Generation
A central contribution of my research is the automatic creation of
inputs. I propose to use the taint information of LTaint to guide
the input generator. As a starting point I plan to use an evolution-
ary algorithm, which in general consists of two components: a) a
generator for new inputs and b) a fitness function.
It is possible to use dynamic tainting for creating evolutionary
operators on the fly as opposed to static operators usually applied
by such algorithms. At the beginning, default mutation operators
are used, such as an adaption of bit-flipping [10] on strings (i.e.
character vectors). This approach randomly picks parts of an in-
dividual input and changes the values at the respective positions
arbitrarily.
With dynamic tainting this process can be more precisely con-
trolled.While executing the program, additional mutation operators
are generated and added to the list of available mutations. For exam-
ple, a json parser may require a file to start with a ‘{’. LTaintwould
report, that a branch instruction checks whether the first character
is a ‘{’, so one possible mutation is setting the first character of an
input to ‘{’. Even for less specific cases, LTaint is able to report
which parts of the input influence a specific branch instruction
by reporting the taints of the operands of the instruction. To alter
which branch is taken the mutation algorithm can use the muta-
tion operators only on this part of the input instead of mutating
randomly. To the best of my knowledge, the on-the-fly generation
of mutation operators based on program executions is not done by
any existing approach.
The fitness function is able to use tainting and execution infor-
mation produced by dynamic tainting to evaluate the quality of
any given input. Different heuristics can be used to achieve this.
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Possible heuristics are the number of executed (branch) instruc-
tions or the coverage on the input, i.e. the portion of input that was
actually read by the program. I expect that a lexer or parser stops
shortly after reading an unexpected character or token. Therefore,
the executed (branch) instructions and the coverage on the input
may correlate with the correctness of the input.
4 PLANNED EVALUATION
To evaluate the feasibility, effectiveness and efficiency of the ap-
proach I plan to perform experiments to answer my research ques-
tions.
RQs 1 and 2 concentrate on the effectiveness of the tainting. Thus,
the evaluation is done on handcrafted and real world subjects. For
both RQs I need to evaluate the number of true positives/negatives
and false positives/negatives as well as metrics like precision and
recall based on the ground truth of a micro-benchmark suite.
To the best of my knowledge no micro-benchmark suite3 ex-
ists to test the effectiveness of dynamic tainting tools. Therefore
I create a handcrafted benchmark suite which shows that LTaint
is able to handle specific explicit and implicit tainting challenges.
Nonetheless, this benchmark is artificial and can therefore only
partially show the effectiveness of my approach.
For RQ 1 I need test subjects that reveal the missing high level
information of LLVM. For example, my approach is planned to
report the taints of all elements of a char array (i.e. string) for an
operand which is a pointer to a char array. Since array bounds are
not known in LLVM, the sizes of arrays have to be tracked.
For RQ 2 I need to create test subjects like the one in Figure 2.
They are planned to contain typical implicit data flow patterns that
are used in real world lexers and parsers. Also, I plan to implement
test subjects which contain “noise” in the implementation to show
that the implicit flow detection is sufficiently conservative. Such
noise are implicit data flows which lead to over-tainting, e.g. a loop
which reads a file line by line. A naive approach, which taints all
control flows, would taint all values in the loop with the taints
of the read line, which may lead to full tainting of all data and a
decrease in the tainting precision.
Additionally, I evaluate my approach on real world applications
with highly structured inputs to show that it is able to analyze large
applications. RQs 1 and 2 are also evaluated on those applications.
Since no ground truth exists for real world applications, I have to
compare the tainting with and without high level taints and implicit
data flows to confirm that the additional information is used and
reported by the tainting framework. Furthermore, I might be able
to manually verify reported taints to show the effectiveness on real
world applications.
RQ 3 concentrates on the creation of sample inputs. I plan to use
the same real world applications as for RQs 1 and 2 and evaluate the
efficiency and effectiveness of the input generation. The reference
tools are Klee and afl, the state-of-the-art tools for automatic input
generation. Also, Klee uses symbolic execution and afl genetic
algorithms, the main approaches for input generation from scratch.
All approaches are evaluated in terms of code coverage (e.g. line
and branch coverage), which indicates the efficiency of the methods.
3A benchmark suite with small applications. Each application concentrates on a specific
tainting challenge.
5 EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION
The central contribution of my proposed work is the automatic
generation of test inputs for complex software with highly struc-
tured input by using dynamic taint information in an evolutionary
algorithm. The generated inputs can be used in software testing and
software analysis. Also, the proposed tainting approach is planned
to deliver more information than the state-of-the-art for software
which is solely available on the abstraction level of LLVM bitcode
to enable advanced code analysis, e.g. the generation of grammars.
The automatic creation of test cases which deeply test programs
is still an open question. For highly structured input and complex
programs the state-of-the-art is not able to provide sufficient test
cases. Thus, I plan to use taint information in an evolutionary
algorithm to direct the creation of new offsprings and mutations.
Furthermore, the additional high level taint information of my
approach can be used by tools which rely on dynamic tainting to en-
hance their analysis or even enable it on the level of LLVM bitcode.
One use case is the generation of grammars, e.g. with AutoGram.
Among others, AutoGram needs high level taint information, like
the taints of all array elements. In contrast to others, my approach is
able to report such taint information, e.g. by tracking array bounds
to report full array taints based on a single pointer if needed.
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